Western United 6 - 2 Central Coast Mariners

Western United lined up in a 3-4-2-1 and had a narrow, tight core, that was supplemented by wingbacks who were happy to push up the pitch to provide width.
Central Coast Mariners lined up in a 4-2-2-2 (rectangle!) and looked to attack with numbers, the two strikers leading the line, the two attacking midfielders supporting and the two full backs then both push up high looking to attack and provide extra width. To counter balance, the two defensive midfielders sat deeper.
The way the formations were set up meant that each player had a direct opponent, aside from the centrebacks – both sets of which had a spare man against the opposition attackers.
Mariners playing out from the back into the United press
Mariners wanted to play out from the back, but had great difficulty doing so as United pressed ferociously once Mariners tried to play out of the centrebacks. The formations gave everyone a direct opponent - Kim and Stensness were covered by Burgess and Diamanti, the United wingbacks made up impressive ground to get tight to the fullbacks. When Nisbet and McGlinchey tried to come and collect, their markers were hot on their heels.
Again and again their passing was disrupted and United came away with the ball in very dangerous locations when Mariners were trying to transition from defence to attack. You can see how absurdly aggressive their press is on multiple occasions, where United outnumbered Mariners in their own half (6 min).
It looks like they have been given the strict instruction to try to play the ball out on the ground at all times. This doesn’t really work when you don’t have the required creativity and technique to unlock the press with pinpoint passing and good combination play. The two defensive midfielders were instructed to stay central, while bizarrely neither of Nisbet or McGlinchey were able to make any space to receive passes (Kim wins the ball and is frustrated that no-one is making a run) and insisted on staying central. The desire to play the ball out showed itself when they tried to pass out of dangerous situations with risky passes that were picked off easily around their own box - we'll look at this later with the goals.
With such high pressing, gaps are certain to appear at the back, and that’s exactly what happened. Many times Mariners were a fraction away from connecting with a long ball that could have resulted in a 3v3/4v4 situation (5 min).
This begs the question – why were they so reluctant to go direct? Why not just pump more long balls forwards to Murray and ask the other attackers to push up higher to win second balls?
Western United movement
On the other hand, Western United were able to easily play out of defence, with the centrebacks able to find each other and escape the half-hearted press of Harold and Murray, with a simple 3v2 match up. Pain and Risdon dropped to allow a pass out of defence, and their opponents Gordon and Clisby weren’t as aggressive with their pressing and allowed them time to find passes infield. Burgess and Diamanti made sure to come deep to play as midfielders and help bring the ball up the field. Once they managed to get out of defence, Pain especially would come forward, often being the furthest forward after Berisha. Berisha had a key role to occupy the centrebacks and he did this nicely with nice runs to create space for his teammates.
Burgess and Diamanti came to life and really showed clever movement to drag Kim and Stensness around the pitch. Diamanti worked in combination with Lustica – when Lustica came forward, Diamanti would cut inside in the pocket vacated by Lustica’s run and had the opportunity to spray passes – without any pressure – into Berisha and Burgess up front, or Pain on the opposite flank
Burgess was more direct, running into the channel after coming short to link play and drag the midfielder out. With Pain hugging the touchline causing Gordon to follow, the channel between Gordon and Tongyik was left quite wide. The defensive midfielders were not particularly comfortable, or skilled at tracking runners and defending in wide areas, but with the Mariners full backs pushing very high up the pitch, this became one of their core roles. Gordon and Kim/Stensness had difficulty in coordinating who had control of that rightback zone and the inside left pocket. The result was neither here nor there, and both Pain and Burgess had space to drive into both areas.

The 3-1 goal illustrates a perfect example:
Kim tracks Burgess on the ball
Ball is played to Pain, Gordon comes out of RB to press
Burgess receives the ball in the open channel, Kim keeps tracking Burgess
Gordon comes back to RB zone to cover, leaving Pain unmarked
Gordon tells Kim to pick up Pain’s run – which he tries to but fails as the ball is played inside him
CCM have possession (but try to play the ball in their own box to get out???)
Pain nips in to steal the ball, and no-one picks up Burgess in the RB zone.
But actually all 4 of the first half goals exploit this area
1-0: Burgess driving through causes Gordon to pick him up and assign Stensness to Pain, but Pain has already driven into the inside left space.
4-1 Stensness has Burgess but lets him go. I’m not sure whether to be mad at Gordon, but this really shows the pulling power that Berisha has on the defence.
Saving the best for last.
The 2-1 goal is a perfect summary for the entire game:
Mariners playing out of the back
All four attackers out of shot – how can they link play?
Both Full backs are out of shot, too high up the pitch (notice Kim motioning to Gordon to drop deep when they try to circulate the ball to the right)
Ferocious press (notice Diamanti waving Lustica forward) (5 pressing against 4 in their half!)
Poor pass into the CAM under pressure
Kim trying to track the run of Burgess
Berisha making a dummy run to pull CBs away from Burgess
Kim trying to keep possession of the ball instead of clearing